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The purpose of this study is to analyze the possibility of political influence 
upon the Department of Justice merger decisions within the brewing industry. 
Political preference was measured by the congressional ratings of a liberal 
political action committee, The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), thus 
giving a liberalness score. Regressions including the merger guideline variables 
and the political preference measurement were estimated with a logit model. 
After running numerous regressions, the addition of the political preference 
variable resulted in insignificance for otherwise significant 1968 and 1982 
guidelines variables. These results may indicate an inability of the model to 
differentiate between political pressure on antitrust enforcement during the 
establishment of the 1968 and 1982 guidelines, or beyond the establishment of 
the guidelines. However, the Chair of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, the 
oversight committee for the Department of Justice, is found to be the most 
significant with liberalness having a positive impact upon the probability of DOJ 
merger litigation. 
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37 CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER
 
DECISIONS: A CASE STUDY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of political pressure on 
Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement of the anti-merger laws. Rather than 
using agency information on the number of challenged cases as compared to the 
concurrent political climate, this study analyzes the political influence on antimerger 
enforcement in one industry, the brewing industry, from 1951-1989.  This industry 
is ideal for such a study because it exhibits increasing concentration and it is a 
national industry. Additionally, the brewing industry has an adequate sample of 
horizontal mergers, rather than vertical or conglomerate mergers which may evoke 
a different enforcement of the laws. 
The test of the relationship between the DOJ antitrust enforcement and 
political influence requires a measure of liberalness. The congressional ratings by 
a political action group, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), are used to 
quantify the degree of political liberalness on a scale from 0-100 with 100 being the 
most liberal. The chairs, ranking republicans, and ranking democrats of the Senate 
and House Judiciary Committees and the Subcommittees on Antitrust, were rated 
by the ADA, and their scores are used in the model. The other variables included 
in the empirical model are determined by the DOJ merger guidelines and their 2 
changes in 1968 and 1982.'  Variables included are:  market share of the buyer, 
market share of the seller, probability that selling firm will fail, the industry's four 
firm concentration ratio, market share of imports, purchasing of only brands and 
not facilities, a market extension rather than a horizontal merger variable, and 
dummy variables to capture the effect of the change in the merger guidelines in 
1968 and 1982. 
A logit model is used to determine the probability that a particular merger 
is challenged. Most of the guideline variables were significant such as: the market 
share of the seller, the market share of the buyer, the four firm concentration ratio, 
and the 1968 and 1982 guideline variables. In terms of political pressure, the 
Chairman of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee is found to have a positive and 
significant effect on antitrust enforcement. However, the individual effects of the 
chairman, ranking republican, and ranking democrat of the Senate Antitrust 
Subcommittee became increasingly significant with the removal of the 1968 and 
1982 law variables. Further experiments with the model's specification suggest that 
there is difficulty in distinguishing the separate effects of the ADA political variable 
and the changes in the guideline variable.  This is reasonable as congress 
influences merger decisions by first writing laws and later by possibly influencing 
regulators. Moreover, in this model political pressure is hard to determine, but the 
U.S. Department of Justice merger guidelines, May 30, 1968. For text of the 
1968, 1982, and 1984 guidelines, refer to; Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar 
Association, Horizontal Mergers: Law and Policy 264-336 (1986). 3 
political rating of the Senate Antitrust Chair was significant in the DOJ antitrust 
enforcement within the brewing industry regardless of the presence of the 1968 and 
1982 changes in the merger guidelines. 
II. THE AN'l I IRUST LAWS 
The Sherman act of 1890 was partially enacted in response to the increase 
in the monopoly power of large nationally known firms; the crude beginnings of the 
modern American corporation. Section 1 of this first federal antitrust legislation 
forbids cartels; "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal...". Courts have not interpreted Section 2 
to mean that monopolies are illegal, but rather that it is forbidden to "behave as a 
monopoly"! The Sherman Act did not clarify to what extent a response to new 
competition would be considered illegal, thus the Clayton Act and Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914 were passed in order to clear the obscurity. The Clayton 
Act was aimed at prohibiting 4 particular types of behavior: 
2  Section 2 states that," every person who shall monopolize or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony...". 4 
Section 2 - price discrimination that hinders competition (later amended in 
1936 by the Robinson-Patman Act), 
Section 3  the use of tie-in and exclusive dealing contracts that lessen 
competition, 
Section 7  mergers that reduce competition, and 
Section 8 - prohibits interrelated Boards of Directors from controlling 
competing firms. 
Further, permission to recover treble damages by the injured parties is granted by 
the Clayton Act. The Federal Trade Commission Act created the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to enforce the antitrust laws. Mainly, the FTC oversees section 
5, which prohibits "unfair" methods of competition.  The FTC also enforces 
consumer protection and the prevention of deceptive advertising. 
The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act to 
strengthen its legislation on merger activity.  The elimination of horizontal 
conglomeration was argued by the courts to be the aim of the amended Section 7 
and that enforcement should be for the "protection of competition, not competitors, 
and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may 
tend to lessen competition."  Even though one view of antitrust goals may be to 
increase efficiency, efficiencies alone (before the 1982 guidline changes) generally 
did not provide justification for a merger resulting in increased concentration and 
expected increased in prices.  After 1982, efficiences may, however, provide a 
justification for a merger which may increase concentration if prices are expected 5 
to decrease. 
Frustrating ambiguities in the determinants of merger litigation led to the 
construction of merger guidelines in 1968. The goal of the DOJ was to reduce the 
uncertainty within the business community concerning merger enforcement. The 
1968 guidelines rely primarily on a structural standard when evaluating horizontal 
mergers. For example, in markets with a 4 firm concentration ratio' (CR4) of 75% 
or greater, the firms will most likely face a merger challenge provided the market 
shares for the acquiring and acquired firms are: 4% and 4% or more, 10% and 2% 
or more, and 15% and 1% or more respectively. Where the Cr4 is less than 75, 
challenged mergers would generally have market shares for the acquiring and 
acquired firms as: 5% and 5% or more, 10% and 4% or more, 15% and 3% or 
more, 20% and 2% or more, and 25% and 1% or more, respectively.  As the 
concentration ratio is central to merger decisions, defining the relevant market 
becomes contentious since there are no clear guidelines in this definition. The use 
of a broader' market definition, supported by merger proponents, "will [result in] 
fewer antitrust challenges" (Foer, p.2'7).  (Tremblay 1993): 
The four firm concentration ratio measures the total market share of the 
largest four firms' share of industry sales. If this share is large, the industry is said 
to be concentrated and less competitive than when the concentration ratio is low. 
4 "Concentration figures of any kind are derivative:  if the market is broadly 
defined, concentration will virtually always be lower than if the market is narrowly 
defined" (Foer p.26). 
3 6 
In addition, the 1968 guidelines state that the DOJ: 
1.  may ignore these structural standards for industries being 
significantly transformed (e.g. by technological changed), since market 
boundaries may be uncertain; 
2. will apply a more strict standard in markets where there is a 
significant trend toward concentration; 
3.  will not allow the acquisition of an important (disturbing, 
disruptive, or unusually competitive) rival in the market; 
4. will allow the acquisition of a failing firm if the failing firm does 
not have a reasonable prospect for survival and there are no other 
buyers that would better promote competition; 
The 1982 guidelines add that the DOJ: 
5.  will accept an efficiency defense but only in exceptional 
circumstances; and 
6.  will apply a more lenient standard for market extension mergers 
(a merger between two firms selling a similar product in different 
geographic markets). 
The 1982 merger guidelines were designed to be less strict than the 1968 
5 Tremblay (1993). 7 
guidelines and they "focus on preventing a price increase from enhanced market 
power due to a merger, especially when no countervailing efficiencies are present" 
(Coate 1992. p.278).  These guideline examine factors such as:  concentration 
(along with a definition of relevant markets), entry barriers, ease of collusion, 
efficiency and failing firm status.  Along with the 1982 change in the merger 
guidelines, the measurement of market concentration was changed from the 4 firm 
concentration ratio to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)6. The HHI equals 
the sum of the squared market shares of each firm in the market.  If the HHI is 
greater than 1800 a market is considered highly concentrated, if the HHI greater 
than or equal to 1000 moderately concentrated, and if the HHI is less than 1000 a 
market is considered unconcentrated.  These new guidelines also have a more 
precise definition of the relevant market; all products and firms that would be part 
of a successful cartel, i.e. rivals that customers would switch to if prices were raised 
5% by the firm.  Finally, the 1984 revision places a greater emphasis on the 
efficiency defense. 
It would seem that the antitrust enforcement is duplicated by the existence 
The HHI was considered as a more accurate measure of industry 
concentration and thus replaced the concentration ratio. Carlton and Perloff note 
that "The HHI can be theoretically derived as the right index of concentration to 
use to explain prices in a particular model of oligopoly behavior.  Typically, 
empirical results do not depend on whether one uses the HHI or a four-firm 
concentration index to measure industry concentration.  The HHI can be 
theoretically derived as the right index of concentration..." (1990 p 370). 
6 8 
of both the DOJ and the FTC. The agencies however share the enforcement of 
particular sections of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and enforce other sections 
alone.'  However, "some antitrust experts maintain that the Federal Trade 
Commission should transfer its duties in Antitrust enforcement to the Antitrust 
Division of the DOJ" (Katzmann 1980, p 1948 Since the two agencies overlap in 
their areas of enforcement, it is conceivable that there would be some competition 
between the two departments. 
Because of an interactive liaison system between the 2 agencies, however, 
confrontations are generally avoided.  This liaison system established in 1948, 
creates a pool' of potential cases. The agencies consult each other in order to gain 
clearance to conduct investigations. "Usually, one agency will automatically grant 
7 The Department of Justice has sole jurisdiction over criminal matters under 
the Sherman Act. The FTC has sole jurisdiction over section 2 of the Clayton Act 
and section 5 of the FTC act. Both agencies share enforcement on sections 2,3,7 
and 8 of the Clayton Act. 
8 In the 1960 Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report on regulatory agencies 
to the President-elect, Dean James Landis suggested to President-elect Kennedy the 
transfer of FTC antitrust duties to the DOJ. 
8'  Before the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requiring firms to submit merger 
propositions to the DOJ," the DOJ personnel learned about mergers from 
complaints, the Wall Street Journal or trade press" (Johnson, p.969). Mergers may 
have occurred before 1976 without the DOJ's knowledge; however even after the 
H-S-R, merging firms may still go undetected it they are "structured to avoid H-S-R 
filing criteria" (Johnson). 9 
clearance to the other to pursue an investigation, unless the contemplated action 
duplicates or interferes with a case that it is already conducting" (Katzmann, 1980 
p 193).' Officials from the DOJ and FTC decide which will review a particular 
merger mainly on the basis of which department has the most experience with the 
firm or industry. For example, the FTC will pursue cases within the department 
store or supermarket industry, whereas the DOJ pursues cases in the Steel Industry. 
There are arguments as to the necessity of both agencies which brings about 
comparison of staff and external pressures. The DOJ is noted for having a superior 
legal staff, even though both agencies have a high turnover rate as lawyers use their 
experience to gain positions in private practice.  Both the FTC and DOJ are 
susceptible to external political pressure. As the DOJ is a part of the executive 
branch, pressure from the President as well as Congress may exist. Further, as the 
FTC is under the legislative branch, there is concern of Congressional influence 
within this agency. A reasonable amount of literature has accumulated with respect 
to the Congressional influence upon the FTC, including studies by R. Posner, B. 
Weingast, and M.Coate (see literature review). With the close relationship of these 
2 agencies and their duties, an evaluation of the Congressional and even 
Presidential influence on the DOJ may substantiate any claims of political pursuits 
within the antitrust area. 
"The clearance process has prevented a wasteful duplication of effort 
"(Katzmann, p194). The requests for clears are generally handled in 5 days. 
10 10 
Suzanne Weaver (1977) purposes that there is political influence on the DOJ 
through  formal  Congressional  oversight  from  the  Senate  Antitrust 
Subcommittee,and through the case selection process. The relationship between the 
Antitrust Subcommittee and the DOJ consists of the subcommittee "suggesting areas 
where cases might lie" (Weaver, 1977 p.152). In addition, the Senate Subcommittee 
on Antitrust conducts hearings regularly on competition within various industries 
and the economy as a whole. At some point, attention is directed toward the DOJ's 
Antitrust division operations within the area under consideration. 
Decisions to select a case are difficult to attribute to outside influences. It 
is alleged that some cases prone to political intervention were rejected because the 
DOJ presented an inferior case leading the Attorney General to believe the defense 
arguments to be superior. This tactic of deliberately presenting an inferior case 
would not be as evident among marginal cases as it would be with extreme cases, 
hence marginal cases may be more susceptible to seemingly superior defense 
arguments. 
Moreover, outside detection of political influence, through formal oversight 
and case selection, can be difficult to detect as well as measure. However, various 
studies have analyzed the possibility of political influence on antitrust enforcement 
decisions using various measurements of political preferences. 11 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The belief in influence of politics in antitrust enforcement has a long history. 
Being only a theory, however, it has sparked a number of empirical constructs to 
validate the intuition of congressional dominance over regulatory agencies. 
"A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement" 
Richard Posner (1970) analyzed various antitrust enforcement agencies 
including the DOJ and FTC.  Within this study, Posner looked at various 
implications and possible causes of the number of antitrust cases filed. The data 
included cases from 1890-1969". 
Even though Posner studied a variety of implications from this data, this review will 
only focus on the ideas most pertinent to the topic at hand, political influence'. 
"  Though the data only extend until 1969, the history of the antitrust 
enforcement will at the least give a setting for historical political involvement and 
provide a basis for current actions. 
"  Posner viewed various effects including the increase in the number of 
antitrust cases by both the DOJ and FTC over time. He also noted a correlation 
between antitrust cases and the level of overall economic activity until 1940. After 12 
Posner considered that "one factor of potentially great explanatory power is politics, 
[in particular] the identity of the party in the White House" (p.411). The number 
of antitrust cases compared to the years of White House occupancy denoted that 
the Democrats had 979 cases with 58.2% of White House occupancy between 1905­
1969.  The Republicans brought 550 cases with only 41.8%  occupancy.  In 
proportion to occupancy, the democrats should have brought 890 cases, but were 
89 cases in excess.  It should be noted that a fair amount of the Republican 
administrations was during the first of the century when overall antitrust activity was 
low. To correct for this differnece, Posner split the time periods from 1905-1937 
and 1937-1969. In the first period, the Democrats brought only 110 cases, yet as a 
proportion of occupancy, they should have brought 144 cases. In the second period, 
the democrats brought 876 cases yet proportionally should have had 868 cases. 
Posner additionally tests whether the number of cases during an election year is 
above or below average and found that 26.7% were initiated in the election year, 
slightly above the 25% average. 
Posner concluded that there is "no systematic tendency of one party to 
increase or decrease antitrust activity upon taking office", and more generally, that 
"it does not appear that the identity of the party in power has much influence on 
the quantity or quality of the Justice Department's antitrust activity"(Posner, 1970). 
1940 the number of DOJ cases did not increase significantly as the economy 
expanded. Posner concluded that antitrust activity is not determined by overall 
economic activity. 13 
"Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?" 
Weingast and Moran (1983) examine the correlation of the 1979-1981 public 
Congressional intervention into the FTC with the change in congressional 
committee preferences.  In the 1979, Congress publicly charged the FTC with 
regulatory abuse on a series of cases, criticized policy initiatives, and stopped funds 
that caused the agency shut down.  Although funds were revewed, public 
Congressional intervention questioned the direction of FTC policy. 
In Weingast's study, congressional preferences of the Committee on 
Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs were determined by the ratings of 
the political action committee Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Weingast 
and Moran show that prior to the 1979-81 FTC reversals, there was a shift in 
committee preferences. For the period from 1977-1979, both the subcommittee's 
and the Senate's mean ratings fell from 57.7 to 26.4 and 45.5 to 37.5, respectively. 
Since these figures from 1977-1979 "represent a marked change in committee 
preferences from proactivist to anti-activist, it follows from our model that the 
committee would alter regulatory policy" (Weingast, 1983). 
Weingast further extends his analysis to test whether Congress influenced the 
FTC before 1979.  Since the choice of cases by the agency is used as a policy 
instrument, Weingast compares congressional committee preferences with agency 
choice of cases. This is done by viewing 3 different categories of cases (namely 14 
credit cases, textile cases and Robinson-Patman cases') and noting the distribution 
of these cases over the years, then correlating these with the change in 
congressional preferences. 
The results of the political variables (ADA ratings which quantify the 
congressional preferences) were shown to be significant and of a positive sign, with 
the Senate being more important than the House in terms of significance and 
magnitude.  Hence, as liberalness increases merger activity increases.  From 
calculating the partial derivatives of the probability of opening a particular type of 
case, Weingast determines the change in the ADA score needed to change the 
probability of a particular case being opened by the agency.  Subcommittee 
members were shown to have 2.5 times more influence over choice of cases by the 
agency than non-subcommittee members, and the subcommittee chair was shown 
to have 12 times more influence than non-subcommittee members. The inclusion 
of a budget variable in the regression sought to determine the influence of the 
Appropriations Committee, hence the effect of "rewards".  This variable was 
significant in all three cases. 
Weingast and Moran found that "the 1976-79 changes in the Senate 
subcommittee are large enough to result in dramatic shifts in agency decisions. The 
Credit cases refer to cases falling under the Truth-in-Lending Act of Fair 
Credit Reporting Act. 
Textile cases refer to cases falling under the fur, wool or textile statutes. 
Robinson-Patman cases refer to cases falling under the Clayton Act 
section 2 as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 
13 15 
statistical evidence implies that the FTC is remarkably sensitive to changes in the 
composition of its oversight subcommittee and in its budget" (Weingast, 1983). 
"Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges" 
In a similar study, Malcom Coate (1990) models FTC antitrust enforcement 
as influenced by pressure from Congress and he evaluates the roles played by FTC 
lawyers and economists in influencing FTC action. The data used are from internal 
FTC records from 1982-1986. 
In this model, one variable for political pressure is identified by "the number 
of times politically appointed FTC staff were called before congressional 
committees to testify on their antitrust enforcement records...[this is] a technique 
that politicians use frequently to increase amounts of antitrust enforcement." (Coate 
1990, p.474). Another variable that may influence merger decisions is the amount 
of news coverage given to the merger. "The larger the merger, the more likely it 
is to result in job losses, plant closings or relocations, and revenue losses to local 
jurisdictions, thus more likely to encounter political resistance" (Coate 1990, p. 473). 
This news variable is measured by the number of articles in the Wall Street Journal 
mentioning the merger. 
In conjunction with determining the effects of political pressure, Coate 
accesses FTC inside information to contrast the influence of FTC staff economists 16 
and staff lawyers in the evaluation of potential mergers.'  Coate suggests that 
lawyers prefer more litigation in order to gain higher salaries, advance in position, 
and "build capital" for private employment. Economists, however, do not have these 
requirements in order to move into higher positions. In this model, disagreement 
among lawyers and economists is captured by how each defines the relevant market 
with respect to given guideline variables. Variables such as the HHI, barriers to 
entry and ease of collusion are evaluated by economists and lawyers and used to 
determine the probability of litigation. The question is if one group's evaluations 
weigh more heavily in the commission's final decision. 
Coate found that when economists and lawyers disagree that the lawyers 
interpretation weighs more heavily in commission decisions. Moreover, "lawyers' 
evaluation of the variables identified in the merger guidelines has a greater effect 
than does the evaluation by economists" (Coate 1990, p.481). 
Coate found that the commission does respond to political influences. "The 
Wall Street Journal story raises the probability of a challenge 4.7 percentage points, 
and one additional congressional hearing raises the probability of a merger 
challenge by 4.2 percentage points" (Coate 1990, p.476). Coate infers that in the 
interest of retaining constituents such as laborers and management, those in 
Congress have an incentive to block mergers. 
" The staff economists and lawyers provide information about a particular 
merger to the 5 FTC commissioners who, in turn, vote for or against a merger 
challenge. 17 
IV. THEORY 
The existence of political pressure on regulatory agencies is determined by 
the interpretation of the observed relationship between Congress and the antitrust 
enforcement agencies. To determine Congressional influence, Congress' observed 
actions are open to interpretation either as limited intervention into FTC affairs, 
or as hidden political pressure. Weingast proposes the following list of observed 
Congressional actions toward the FTC: 
1. The lack of oversight hearings. 
2. The infrequency of congressional investigations and policy resolutions. 
3. The perfunctory nature of confirmation hearings of agency heads. 
4. The lack of apparent congressional attention to or knowledge about the 
ongoing operation and policy consequences of agency choice. 
5. The superficiality of annual appropriations hearings. 
Two different approaches seek to explain the existence of these 5 
observations. The first approach proposes the independence of regulatory agencies 
from Congressional influence. This traditional approach views these observations 
as evidence of a failure of Congress to oversee and control regulatory agencies. 
Control by Congress is  inhibited by several factors:  regulatory agencies' 
independent control over information leading to regulation, the access to agency­18 
clientele possibly encouraging alliances, and high cost of passing new legislation to 
steer agency policy. Moreover, the traditional view takes the 5 observations at face 
value suggesting that "by and large, regulatory commissions are not under close 
scrutiny by the White House or Congress." (Wilson 1980, p.388) 
The second approach explains the 5 observations depiction of a seemingly 
distant relationship through informal incentives, thus establishing Congressional 
dominance. These informal and mutually "understood" incentives are established 
through budgetary favors or through threatening sanctions such as new legislation, 
specific prohibitions in order to hurt "pet projects" or embarrass chairmen, as well 
as appointments and reappointments (Weingast 1983, p. 769). Hence, this approach 
suggests that harsh punishments and generous rewards may provide adequate 
incentives to serve congressional pressure.  This sort of system creates a 
"congressional conscience" within regulatory agencies that may sway decisions 
according to current congressional preferences. Ideally, Congress should "publically 
debate policy alternatives then issue directives to agencies (Weingast 1983, p.769). 
Rather, Congressional domination of regulatory agencies occurs through concealed 
incentives to establish a congressional conscience. These incentives are the real 
cause of the observed relationship between Congress and regulatory agencies, hence 
exposing the 5 observations as being surface only.  Moreover, direct actions are 
scarce when indirect, but compelling, incentives are effective. 
It can be seen that the 5 observations of the apparent Congressional distance 
from regulatory agencies could be explained through traditional means of
 19 
Congressional noninterference, or through underlying rewards or punishments 
seeking to act as a congressional conscience for the regulatory agency. 
Another motivation for a politician to influence a particular merger decision 
depends upon the potential gains or loses in constituent support. 'That is, well-
organized private groups purchase regulatory favors in the political marketplace, 
benefiting both themselves and politician-sellers at the expense of less well-
organized groups" (Coate, 1990).  Thus, in any merger there are "winners" and 
"losers".  Shareholders of a particular firm being threatened by a take over will 
ordinarily expect a gain in the value of their holdings.  The potential gain in 
shareholders returns will be a result of managers running the firm more efficiently 
in order to avoid a takeover.  Shareholders then may have an incentive to be 
politically active in a particular merger decision except for their geographic 
dispersal and their large numbers. Organizing such a group would be difficult as 
the gains for each individual shareholder would not be enough to motivate 
individual political action. Further, the political influence would be minor due to 
their dispersion throughout various congressional districts. Moreover, the group with 
individually meager, potential gains from a merger is too large and dispersed to 
have any great impact on a particular member of Congress. 
The group facing potential loses, however, may be smaller but is more 
concentrated within one congressional district.  Managers and laborers of the 
threatened company may be subject to layoffs or relocation as a result of the 
merger or of restructuring for efficiency.  These high costs to constituents may 20 
pressure the respective politician to attempt to defeat the merger or at the least, 
slow it down and increase the possibility that the merger will be abandoned. 
Wilson noted, "Exceptional majorities propelled by the public mood and led by a 
skillful policy entrepreneur take action that might not be possible under ordinary 
circumstances" (p.97). Therefore, this high cost of a merger to a concentrated block 
of voters may propel antimerger action by their congressman. 
The high costs and concentration of employees may outweigh the individual 
gains  by  geographically  dispersed  shareholders,  and  thus,  may instigate 
congressional action against a merger. However, Coate comments that "Political 
considerations alone will not determine agency decisions. Although, at the margin, 
political demands for enforcement will increase the bureaucratic supply ofmergers 
challenged" (1990, p.4.70). 
Weingast's analysis, which is a practical application of work by Fiorina (1974) 
and Fenno(1978), concludes that congressmen "vote their district". To understand 
committee benefits, we must assume the Fiorina et.al conclusion  - that each 
politician votes so as to maximize support within his district. 
The combination of the committee system for legislative action and the size 
of congressional districts provides a more stable line of legislative power for the 
interests of the constituents. Interests within this small district of voters tend to be 
uniform and thus intensely influential upon the district's representative seeking 
voter support. Mitchell in his analysis of pubic choice comments,"rational citizens, 
politician's and bureaucrats are pursuing the only intelligent course of action, 21 
namely, rent-seeking and redistribution" (1984 p.168).  Legislative power is 
enhanced by the structure within Congress which consists of committees and 
subcommittees that are divided and specialized into narrow areas of interest. The 
congressional committee system establishes a means for providing benefits to each 
group and reducing intergroup conflicts hence increasing the welfare of all 
legislators. This system allows practically monopoly control over specific areas and 
policies through the opportunity to make proposals as well as veto control over 
proposals made by others, "therefore partially insulating agency policy from outside 
influence" (Weingast 1983, p.775).  In conjunction with this policy power, 
committees are formed by self selection. It is then to the congressman's advantage 
to select a committee and gain leverage within the areas of his constituents' interest. 
This explains why agricultural committees are dominated by legislators from 
farming districts and why the interior and public land committees are dominated 
by congressmen from the western states.  Weingast proposes that "each legislator 
gives up some influence over many areas of policy in return for a much greater 
influence over the one that, for him, counts the most" (1983, p.771).  Weingast 
further implies that a change in the composition of regulatory oversight committees 
leads to major shifts in agency policy. 22 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This study attempts to determine the true process which decides the fate of 
a proposed merger within the brewing industry. The merger decisions are to be 
based on the specific guidelines set by the Department of Justice, and are "supposed 
to structure merger regulation to make enforcement decisions consistent, increasing 
predictability and lowering private transaction costs" (Coate 1992, p. 279). The 
Tremblay (1993) analysis of the consistency between the law and its actual 
enforcement within the brewing industry used a logit model to determine the 
probability that the Justice Department will challenge a merger. Based  on the 
merger guidelines it contained the following independent variables: 
MSb = the premerger market share of the buying firm.
 
MS, = the market share of the selling firm.
 
PROB,, = the predicted probability that a selling firm will fail and exit the 
industry. 
CR4 = the industry's four firm concentration ratio. 
Dbrsnd  a brand dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm purchases only 
the brands (not facilities) of another firm (0 otherwise). 
MSin, = the market share of imports. 
Did = a concentration trend dummy variable, which equals 1 for the i 
(i =2,3,4,...8)largest firms if the firms concentration ratio increases by seven 
percent or more over a 5- to 10- year period (0 otherwise). 
Driix = a market expansion merger dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm 23 
makes a market extension (rather than a horizontal) merger (0 otherwise). 
D68 = a 1968 merger guideline dummy variable, which equals 1 from 1968 
through 1981 (0 otherwise). 
D82 = a 1982 merger guideline dummy variable, which equals 1 from 1982 
through 1989 (0 otherwise). 
The model to determine possible political influence on DOJ merger 
decisions will also use a logit regression and the Tremblay variables with the 
addition of a political rating variable.  The following is a description of the logit 
model: 
PROB*"e = po  pimsb  02ms5 + p3pRoBsi + P4 CR4  B  .  5Dbrand  P 6 ms: 
f37Dtrend  138Dmx  (39D68  1310D82 +  11ADAscore 
where the latent variable PROB.lit equals the probability of a merger being 
challenged, and the observed PROBlit is defined: 
PROBli, = 1 if the merger was challenged; 
PROBlit = 0 otherwise; 
The data include 106 proposed or actual mergers within the brewing industry 
from 1950-1989 (see appendix B). The ADAscore variable is used to rate the 
differing legislator offices of the House and Senate: 24 
The Judiciary Committee : 
Chair, Ranking Republican, Ranking Democrat 
The Subcommittee on Antitrust: 
Chair, Ranking Republican, Ranking Democrat 
The measurement of liberalness among the House and Senate Chairs, 
Ranking Republicans and Ranking Democrats for the Judiciary Committee and 
Antitrust Subcommittee is a rating system of a liberal political action committee, 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).15  The ADA catalogues the voting 
records of each Congressional member on approximately 12 major legislative issues. 
They then calculate the percentage of responses supporting the ADA position which 
is then the score. The scores of those in congress range between 0 and 100, with 
100 being the most supportive of ADA legislative positions or most liberal. A 
numerical value for the political variable is chosen over a discrete variable 
(1= democrat and 0 = republican) in order to provide more accuracy to actual 
liberalness.  Democrats for example are all not necessarily more liberal than 
Republicans.  In some cases the ADA score was higher, indicating more 
"liberalness", for certain Republicans than for certain Democrats. Further, even 
within the Democratic party there is a noted difference in political position of 
The ADA voting Record has been published annually since 1947 and is a 
"standard measure of political idealogy as well as legislative performance" (ADA 
informational circular). Their efforts are to "push progressive legislation and fight 
regressive Republicans and conservative Democratic obstruction" (ADA). 
15 25 
Southern and Northern Democrats. Thus, with yearly tabulations of voting records 
and their compliance with ADA positions'', an annual liberalness score can be 
obtained for every Congressional member. The ADA scores, "shown to be a good 
index of legislators' preferences" (Weingast 1983), should indicate the degree  to 
which the preference of more liberal politicians leads to more merger challenges 
within the Department of Justice. 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Table A, results for the original guideline model without the political 
variable are presented along with 5 other pertinent logit regressions.  The 
regression without the ADA political variable (Table A; run 1) results in 
insignificance for Dbrand, MSim, Dtrend and Dmx which may be expected as these 
variables are intended to capture decisions in special cases (Tremblay, 1993). In 
1'  In 1987 the ADA ranked Congress using 20 legislative issues. The votes 
cover the "full spectrum of domestic, foreigh, economic, military and social issues" 
(ADA Today 1987). The ADA tries to select votes with sharp conservative/liberal 
devisions. For example, in 1987 one issue was: 
1.  Plastic Handguns-HR2616 
Motion to table [kill] Metzenbaum (D-OH)-Thurmond (R-SC) amendment to 
prohibit hard-to-detect plastic fire-arms. PASSED 47-42 [No = + ]  (+ favors the 
ADA position). 
Other issues were the Bork Nomination, Strategic Defense Initiative-S 1174, 
Nuclear Waste-HR2700, Contra Aid-HRRes 175, and Homeless-HR 558. 26 
TABLE A 
Independent  Regression Equations 
variables 
reg. 1  reg. 2  reg. 3  reg. 4  reg. 5  reg. 6 
Intercept  -12.718'  - 13.198"  -7.318  -19.726"  -15.802b  -22.044" 
( 6.35)  (4.95)  (1.16)  (5.14)  (5.09)  (4.19) 
MS  57.829'  62.135"  63.276'  58357"  53.868"  54.116, 
( 5.98)  (4.97)  (6.21)  (4.94)  (4.25)  (3.23) 
MS,  291.3'  354.9'  336.2'  320.0'  338.8'  346.1' 
(10.84)  (11.22)  (10.84)  (11.62)  (11.89)  (10.01) 
PROBW  -25.487  -52.811  -30.611'  -23.876  -42.649  -41.205 
( 2.49)  (2.43)  (3.05)  (1.37)  (2.14)  (1.62) 
CR,  0.319`  0.083  0.128  0.449  0.186  0.424' 
( 3.01)  (0.14)  (.27)  (3.35)  (0.17)  (2.77) 
DBRAND  - 2.438  -3.030  -2.758  -2.733  -2.990  -3.173 
( 2.11)  (2.05)  (2.10)  (1.87)  (1.95)  (2.24) 
MS,  -426.0  -181.1  -277.6  -8055  -406.7  -621.6 
( 1.47)  (0.17)  (055)  (3.27)  (1.16)  (2.31) 
DTREIND  -0.879  -0.742  -1.656  -1.207  -0.715  -0.0148 
( 0.49)  (0.23)  (1.32)  (0.82)  (0.22)  (0.00) 
D,,  -0.209  -0.914  -0.346  -0.474  -1.081  -1.305 
( 0.03)  (0.34)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.47)  (0.61) 
D  - 9.464"  -4.600  -6.925  -6.949  -3.132  -7.451 
( 5.25)  (0.91)  (2.13)  (2.25)  (0.35)  (256) 
D82  -14574'  - 3.832  -13.178'  -7.805  -2.332  -7.251 
( 5.79)  ( 0.36)  (3.74)  (1.65)  (0.12)  (158) 
SAG!  0.0743' 
( 2.67) 
SARR  -0.018 
(0.43) 
SARD  0.059 
(1.95) 
AVECHRD  0.087' 
(3.06) 
AVE3  0.117 
(2.09) 
number in  106  84  94  94  84  84 
data set 
Likelihood ratio  35.05  25.14  3050  29.08  24.74  2533 
significant at the 1% level 
significant at the 5% level 
significant at the 10% level 
Chi-Square statistics are in parenthesis 27 
addition, the deletion of one or all of these insignificant variables produces similar 
results, indicating a stable model. The positive sign and significance of MSB, MSS, 
and C4 can be expected as these are the most important structural variables in the 
merger guidelines. These results demonstrate that as the market share of the buyer 
or seller increases, the probability of litigation increases. Further, as the four firm 
concentration ratio increases, the probability of a merger challenge also increases. 
The results also indicate that the change in merger guidelines in 1968 and 1982 
have a significant and negative impact on the probability of a merger challenge 
supporting the premise that antitrust standards have become more lenient over 
time. The greater absolute value of the estimate for the 1982 guidelines variable 
indicates that "the 1982 merger guidelines... were designed to be less strict than the 
original 1968 version" (Johnson, p 973). 
Using ADA ratings for both the House and the Senate Chairs, Ranking 
Republican and Ranking Democrat of the Judiciary Committee and the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust for the ADAscore variable, the regressions reveal 
insignificance for all except the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee.  As seen in 
regression 2, the Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust variable (SACH) 
is significant at the 10% level and positive indicating that as liberalness increases 
the probability of litigation increases. Further, the addition of the chair variable 
results in the 1968 and 1982 mergers guidelines variable becoming insignificant. 
Alterations of the model (see Table B; regressions 8 and 9) by dropping one or 
more of the originally insignificant variables (dmx, dtrend, msim, dbrand) results in 28 
TABLE B 
Independent  Regression Equations 
variables 
reg. 7  reg. 8  reg. 9  reg. 10  reg. 11  reg. 12 
Intercept  -15.760  -10.092'  -6.058b  -14.242'  -8564'  -8.978' 
(3.87)  (3.61)  (3.81)  (7.27)  (3.02)  (3.28) 
MS,  53.314b  54.002'  50.603'  56.1556  61.186b  39340b 
(3.83)  (7.44)  (7.73)  (3.97)  (5.40)  (5.70) 
MS,  306.7'  325.1`  305.7'  347.0'  339.0'  2725 
(8.62)  (10.83)  (11.46)  (11.45)  (10.08)  (10.66) 
PROBd  -35.442  -43.755'  -34.062b  -48.695  -29.316'  -39.980 
(1.44)  (3.29)  (3.81)  (2.29)  (2.66)  (4.60) 
CR.  -0.129  -0.074  -0.158b  0.1054  0.168  -0.045 
(1.08)  (0.30)  (4.24)  (0.0)  (0.80)  (0.31) 
Dbma  -2.694  -3.032  -2.820 
(1.81)  (2.01)  (2.22) 
MS,.  -63.668  -263.4  -330.6 
(0.04)  (0.89)  (0.82) 
D,.  -0383  -0.743  -1.148 
(0.14)  (0.19)  (0.62) 
D  -0334  -1.044  -0.629 
(0.14)  (0.42)  (0.20) 
D,  -2.600  -2.922  -7.545' 
(0.67)  (054)  (3.17) 
D  -0.845  -1.938  435776 
(0.03)  (0.12)  (4.30) 
SACH  0.162'  0.073'  0.0531'  0.061 
(3.29)  (3.19)  (3.90)  (1.97) 
SARR  -0.002 
(0.01) 
SARD  0.027 
(0.45) 
AVE3  0.079' 
(3.13) 
number in data set  84  84  84  84  84  84 
Likelihood ratio  23.12  28.64  30.16  24.61  2854  3135 
significant at the 1% level 
b significant at the 5% level 
significant at the 10% level 
Chi-Square statistics are in parenthesis 29 
a positive and increasingly significant Chair variable. Dropping both of the 1968 
and 1982 guidelines variables will also result in a significant Chair variable as seen 
in Table B; regression 7. The Ranking Republican (SARR) as well as the Ranking 
Democrat (SARD) scores (Table A; run 2 and 3 respectively)  result in 
insignificance and therefore little explanatory power within determining the 
probability of a merger being challenged. The negative sign on the estimate for the 
Ranking Republican suggests that as the Ranking Republican increases in 
liberalness, the probability of challenging a merger decreases. This counterintuitive 
result will be discussed later in the paper. Run 5 in Table A includes the average 
scores of the Chair and Ranking Democrat of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust (AVECHRD) that result in significance, and imply a positive relationship 
between liberalness and the probability of a merger challenge. Regression 6 in 
Table A includes an average of the Senate Chair, Ranking Democrat and Ranking 
Republican (AVE3) and shows insignificance with a positive relationship between 
liberalness and probability of a merger being challenged. A key point in analyzing 
the outcome of the Ranking Democrat and Chair average (AVECHRD) with the 
outcome of the average of all three (AVE3) may be the absence of the Ranking 
Republican variable. Again, the negative parameter estimate may have an adverse 
effect within an average of an otherwise significant variable (AVECHRD); however 
I will defer this to a later discussion within the paper.  Finally, by concurrently 
including the separate ADA scores for the Chair, Ranking Republican, and Ranking 
Democrat, no joint significance is found (see Table B; run 10 and 11). 30 
Explanation of the Results 
The sole significance of just the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust parallels 
similar findings by Weingast (1983, p. 791), 
The evidence provided by our estimations of the relationship 
of the Congressional ADA scores.  .  .  and the FTC caseload reveals 
substantial Congressional influence.  In the period studied (1965­
1980), the Senate was more important than the House.  .  .  and the 
Senate subcommittee and its chairman have a greater impact than the 
full Senate. 
The positive sign on the Senate subcommittee chair also parallels the 
Weingast findings; however with the inclusion of all of the guideline variables in 
regression 2 (Table A), the Chair is almost significant at the 10% level (0.1021). 
In combination, however, with the significant results from dropping  one or more 
insignificant variables, the influence of the subcommittee Chair is relevant (see 
Table B; runs 7, 8, and 9). 
This study is attempting to identify indirect political influence outside of the 
influence on guidelines or on the laws.  Separation of the outside influence, as 
measured by the ADA, and legal influence, represented by the 1968 and 1982 
guideline variables, may be difficult, "if Congress influences the bureaucratic 
decision to challenge mergers after development of the merger guidelines, it would 
also influence the bureaucratic decisions reflected in the guidelines themselves" 
(Coate, 1990 p.478). This model shows that it is difficult to distinguish between 
direct political influence on an individual merger and the political influence on the 31 
guidelines themselves. Though only the parameter of the Antitrust Subcommittee 
Chair is significant, the addition of any Congressional score to the regression results 
in insignificance for one or both of the 1968 and 1982 guideline variables. Further, 
the deletion of one or more of the 1968 or 1982 guideline variables results in the 
increasing significance of the ADA political variables. A correlation matrix for run 
2 estimates the correlation between the 1982 guideline variable and Antitrust Chair 
to be 0.44 and between the 1968 guideline variable and the Antitrust Chair to be 
0.33. The mid-range correlation with the Chair and the 1968 and 1982 guidelines 
at the least shows that the 2 measures of political influence move in the same 
direction together and are mildly correlated.  It is not inconceivable then that 
pressure reflected within the guidelines and pressure in other forms are difficult for 
this model to distinguish.  Further, the exclusion of the 1982 and 1968 variables 
results in a significant chair variable and an increase in the parameter estimate by 
almost 2 times, undoubtedly capturing the effect of the political influence within the 
guidelines. 
Because the Antitrust Subcommittee generally consists of about 7 legislators, 
an average score of the 3, the Chair, Ranking Republican, and Ranking Democrat, 
should give a better indication of the prevailing preference of this DOJ oversight 
committee. As seen in regression 6 (Table A), the average scores (AVE3) are not 
significant in the model. This result may be explained by the counterintuitive results 
of the Ranking Republican scores. 
In all regressions including a variable for the Ranking Republican of the 32 
Congressional Judiciary Committees or Antitrust Subcommittees, the parameter 
estimate shows an increase in merger litigation as the Ada score for the Ranking 
Republican decreases.  This suggests that as liberalness among the ranking 
republicans decreases the influence increases merger challenges  - not at all 
consistent with the general political philosophy of the party. A possible explanation 
of this counterintuitive result may stem from the consistent difference in parties 
which hold the Chair position and the Ranking Republican position.  The 
combination of the significant influence of the Chair over merger decisions with the 
regression results showing insignificant Ranking Republican influence may allow for 
a decision to challenge a merger regardless of the Ranking Republican preference 
(or ADA score). If the Chair had been consistently republican (lower ADA scores) 
and assuming significance of influence, then outcomes of potential mergers may 
have differed and correlated with the position of the ranking republican thereby 
resulting in a positive parameter estimate. In this case, one would then expect the 
Ranking Democrat variable to be insignificant and to have a negative parameter 
estimate. In support, a correlation matrix shows that the Ranking Republican and 
the Chair have a small but negative correlation (-0.1631). It follows that if the 
preferences of the Chair throughout the data align with the democratic party 
(higher Ada scores),then this negative relationship between the Ranking Republican 
and the number of merger challenges may be captured. In fact, examination of the 
data reveals that the Chair of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee was a democrat 33 
and ranked between 80-100 for all of the years.' 
Within the average of the Antitrust Subcommittee 3 ranking  members, the 
negative parameter estimate may be the result of the negative Ranking Republican 
estimate.  Insignificance of this average may also be  a result of the high 
insignificance of the Ranking Republican. Because intuition would suggest that an 
average of the ranking legislators within a small committee should determine the 
outcome of a merger, the contrary results may depict a strong influence of the 
Ranking Republican variable upon the Chair and Ranking Democrat variables. In 
accord with  intuition,  the average of the Ranking Democrat and Chair 
(AVECHRD) shows significant results. Thus liberalness has a positive impact on 
merger challenge decisions as seen in Table A, run 5. Again, similar to the chair 
variable, as the 1968 and 1982 guidelines are removed the parameter estimate for 
AVECHRD triples from 0.0871 to 0.2474 and the significance doubles from 0.0802 
to 0.0245. The combination of the guideline variables and the AVECHRD variable 
results in insignificant guideline variables again supporting the  difficulty in 
distinguishing between political influence within the guidelines and  political 
pressure beyond the guidelines. 
17 It must be noted that not all Democrats rank higher than republicans in the 
Ada ratings. It is possible for republicans to have scores between 80-100, however 
this is not the case within the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee between 1951-1989. 
In only 4 of the years (1954-1959) the Ranking Republican had an average ranking 
just over 50, however the respective Ranking Democrats and Chairs consistently had 
scores above the Ranking Republican. 34 
VII. CONCLUSION
 
Coate notes that antitrust models have been constructed as an "interest­
group process.  .  .  whereby antitrust is used to benefit well-organized private 
interests" (Coate, 1990). The results of this study do not contradict the interest 
group theory and support that antitrust enforcement is influenced primarily by the 
Chair of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee. This study reveals that as the Chair 
becomes more liberal the probability of the DOJ cahllenging an individual merger 
increases. This power of the Chair over the regulatory agency exemplifies the gains 
of forming smaller more specific committees. Results are supported by the studies 
of Weingast and Coate revealing Congressional influence on the FTC in challenging 
mergers.  Thus, for the brewing industry, political positions play a part either 
through the setting of the guidelines, political pressure beyond the guidelines, or 
perhaps both.  With the pool of studies of both the FTC and DOJ revealing 
supporting evidence of political influence, the lack of a visible relationship between 
Congress and these antitrust agencies suggests an existence of indirect but 
compelling systems of rewards and punishments that  serve Congressional 
preferences. 35 
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Appendix A 
Because the Department of Justice is under the Executive Branch in 
addition to the Congressional oversight committee, an additional model 
including a presidential variable was tested upon the brewing industry data. 
A discrete presidential variable was set equal to 1 for a democratic 
president and 0 for a republican president. Posner comments that " the parties 
have, or at least avow, different economic philosophies and antitrust has always 
been  or seemed - politically controversial" (411). The results of the model are 
as follows: 
Table C 
INDEPENDENT  STANDARD  CHI-SQUARE 
VARIABLE  ESTIMATE 
Intercept  -13.77  5.61 
MSb  59.65  5.78 
MSs  295.60  10.32 
PROBsf  -27.44  2.57 
C4  0.37  2.67 
Dbrand  2.57  2.22 
MSim  -440.0  1.49 
Dtrend  - 0.89  0.52 
Dmx  - 0.17  0.02 
D68  -10.92  3.86 
D82  -16.79  4.10 
Pres  - 0.63  0.17 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO CHI-SQUARE = 34.87
 38 
The presidential variable has a low chi-square indicating low significance 
in the model. Further, the negative coefficient sign is counterintuitive meaning 
that if the President were a democrat, the probability of a merger challenge 
would decrease. This is not consistant with the democratic economic philosophy. 
The insignificance of this variable supports the Posner study, as well as the 
"Gains, Losses " Theory. Since the President has the whole nation as 
constituents, those that would lose from a merger are politically more "watered­
down" than if they appealed to their own Congressman. The dispersal and little 
incentive for individual shareholders still stifles any incentive to encourage a 
merger. Therefore, for the brewing industry, presidential interest in mergers is 
not likely. Weaver notes that "it is fair to say that presidents in postwar America 
have not made antitrst enforcement an object of their sustained or systematic 
intervention" (1977). 39 
Appendix B 
Data Sources 
The source for the member of Congress and the different committees and 
subcommittees was The Congressional Record published by the Congressional 
Quarterly in Washington D.C.. The contributor of the congressional scoring was 
the Americans for Democratic Action Political Action Committee (ADA), 1625 
K Street, N.W. Suite 210, Washington, D.C. 20006, (202)-785-5980. The sources 
of the compiled data for the brewing industry are found in Tremblay (1993). 
Notes on Data 
The data consist of 106 total brewing industry merger proposals from 
1950-1989. The median year of the data set is 1964, indicating that half of the 
observations were before 1964. 
The number of observations for each regression in Table A and Table B 
is different due to the differences in the number of observations for particular 
congressional positions. From 1950-1989, the ADA recorded  scores for each 
member of Congress except in the case of death in office, holding office for 
fewer than 12 votes, or resignation. Two such cases occured within the Chair of 
the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee (SACH), in 1956 and in 1963.  10 proposed 
merger observations were lost as a result of the these missing ADA scores. 
Further, The Congressional Record listed no Senate Antitrust Subcommittee 40 
from 1950-1954 which deletes 12 more observations for a total of 22 deletions 
out of 106 or only 84 complete observations for the SACH. 
ADA rankings for the Ranking Republican (SARR) and Ranking 
Democrat (SARD) are missing the 12 observations from 1950-1954 for the same 
reason as the Chair thus totaling only 98 complete observations. The 
Congression Record does not record a Senate Antitrust Subcommittee from 1981 
1986. Considering the nature of antitrust enforcement of the Reagan 
Administration and the absence of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, a 
Congressional score of 0 is substituted for the Chair, Ranking Republican and 
Ranking Democrat of this committee to reflect the most conservative position's 
- having no Senate DOJ oversight subcommittee at all. However, this 
substitution does not affect the results much as there are only 6 brewing merger 
observations from 1981-1986. 
18 This substitution is done by the author of this paper and does not correlate 
with the ADA score of any partiuclar member of Congress as it is unknown who 
may have held these committee positions. That is, the ADA did not rank as 0 the 
Chair, Ranking Republican and Ranking Democrat of the Senate Antitrust 
Subcommittee, but rather did the author since there was no Committee to oversee 
the DOJ. 